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Structural biases, which are intrinsic in the social structures in which we
function, play a key role in maintaining boundaries between traditionally
privileged and underprivileged groups; however, they are particularly difficult to
identify from within those societies. Two instances are highlighted in which the
social structures of science appear to have discouraged collaboration, to the
disadvantage of software and data users. Possible links are suggested to the
strongly hierarchical structure of science and other factors which may in turn
also serve to maintain sex and/or gender disparities in participation in the
scientific endeavour.
The scientific endeavour is a social process which has the
potential to benefit the whole of humankind. However, not
everyone has equal access to participation in this process, even
when comparing people of equal ability; it is well established
that scientific enterprise is more accessible to participants who
are male (Pell, 1996; Roper, 2019; Astegiano et al., 2019), of
privileged ethnicity (Bhopal & Henderson, 2019) and non-
disabled (Inckle, 2018). This violates our basic notions of
fairness and equality, but also impoverishes the scientific
enterprise by narrowing the pool of available talent on
grounds other than ability, and also by narrowing the range of
perspectives present in the pool of scientists thinking about a
problem (Powell, 2018).
Women perform at comparable levels to men in the early
stages of their careers; however, they are increasingly poorly
represented at later career stages, a difference which remains
even when accounting for the effects of career breaks
(Blackaby et al., 2005), suggesting the presence of a systemic
bias based on sex and/or gender. Awards (such as the Nobel
Prize) and promotions typically disproportionately recognize
those at the top of hierarchies for work which has been
conducted by a large team of researchers (Lincoln et al., 2012),
a process which reduces the visibility of early-career
researchers. Similarly, well established scientists are invited to
give keynote talks at conferences (including the first session of
the CCP4 Study Weekend), further enhancing their visibility.
Science is perhaps the most effective tool humanity has for
distinguishing claims that are objectively true, and its social
structures and conventions, including academic institutions,
journals, grant panels, consensus and peer review, have to
some extent evolved to reduce the impact of subjectivity
(Miller, 2013; Oreskes, 2019), despite the inevitable errors and
cognitive biases of all of the participants (Kahneman, 2011).
However, much of this evolution occurred in an environment
when published science was largely produced by financially
independent abled white males, and it would therefore be
surprising if no systemic biases had been incorporated in these
structures.
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Systemic and structural biases are particularly hard to
recognize when we work exclusively within the system in
which the bias is incorporated, and are also hard to demon-
strate experimentally because to do so involves deconstructing
the system. The early stages of the identification of a systemic
bias inevitably involve speculation based on ad hoc observa-
tions, with the aim of identifying problems for more systematic
research.
This letter was inspired by an apparently similar set of
circumstances arising in two different fields. When a crystallo-
grapher started comparing climate data sets from national
science agencies, the differences led rapidly to a number of
insights which were not being pursued by more experienced
practitioners (Cowtan & Way, 2014; Hausfather et al., 2017;
Cowtan et al., 2018). Similarly, when a computer science
student started comparing crystallographic model-building
software packages (Alharbi et al., 2019), the resulting insights
led to new ways of combining these packages (Alharbi et al.,
2020) and significant improvements to one of them (Bond et
al., 2020). These insights should have been within the reach of
practitioners in the fields, but in both cases it took the inter-
vention of a relatively inexperienced outsider to catalyze the
progress.
It would be interesting to understand the motivations which
led to these events; however, we are not always able to
elucidate our own motivations, let alone those of others. One
instance of a direct critical comparison across groups is
present in Fig. 13 of Hansen et al. (2010): the authors note that
a substantial part of the difference between global tempera-
ture series arises from differences between the spatial
coverage of the data. Hansen et al. (2010) however stop short
of highlighting the result, known decades before, that the
simple mean of a spatially incomplete field is a biased esti-
mator of the global mean (Kagan, 1979; Cowtan et al., 2018).
Based on my own experience, I hypothesize that the tension
between competition-oriented incentives (for example, the
desire to attract users, citations, prestige and funding) and
communal benefits (i.e. the advancement of science by
building on the work of others and having them build on your
work) creates a cognitive dissonance which leads to avoidant
behaviours.
Fang & Casadevall (2015) argue that the ‘history of science
shows that transformative discoveries often occur in the
absence of competition, which only emerges once fields are
established and goals are defined’. They highlight cases where
competition led to incorrect conclusions, including the triple-
stranded model of DNA proposed by Pauling in competition
with Watson (Pauling & Corey, 1953) and the work of Kitasato
on the cause of plague (Bibel & Chen, 1976). High-stress
competitive environments, as typified by the current research
culture, inhibit creativity (Amabile, 1998), while even
moderately competitive environments may differentially
impact the performance of male and female researchers
(Amabile, 1996), with women performing better in more
collaborative environments (Baer et al., 2014).
Hierarchical structures may also play a role both in disin-
centivizing collaboration and in suppressing creativity, as well
as being a possible mechanism by which a structural bias might
suppress gender diversity. Male social interaction styles are
distinguished by higher levels of dominance signalling and
hierarchical behaviours (Maccoby, 1990; Tannen, 2010), and
testosterone is also implicated in hierarchical behaviours
(Eisenegger et al., 2011; Inoue et al., 2017), although the
connection between these factors is complex and probably
involves short-term hormonal influences on behaviour, long-
term hormonal influences on brain structure, and social and
cultural norms which may or may not derive from physical
characteristics (Wood & Eagly, 2012; Pol et al., 2006). While
there are well established social norms for the communication
of ideas within a project hierarchy, the ambiguous relationship
between independent hierarchies of scientists working to solve
the same problemmay hinder collaboration across the borders
of a hierarchy (Tsai, 2002). Established hierarchies can also be
resistant to disruptive ideas from early-career researchers and
scientists with minority perspectives within those hierarchies
(Amabile, 1998; Neumann, 2007).
Gender gaps in STEM fields are often attributed to issues of
confidence in women (Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Shen, 2013), with
confidence-boosting measures as a proposed solution (Baker,
2010; Campbell & Skoog, 2004). Testosterone levels are
known to influence self-confidence (Eisenegger et al., 2011;
Costa et al., 2016), producing an unequal starting point for
men and women, which is in turn reinforced by gendered
behavioural norms and unconscious bias (Easterly & Ricard,
2011). There is a risk therefore that efforts to address gender
gaps through confidence-boosting measures alone are in
practice teaching women to emulate male behaviours, which
contains the implicit assumption that testosterone-dominant
behaviours are in some way optimal for scientific investigation
(Shansky, 2019). This male-normative assumption is ques-
tionable given that gender-diverse groups produce higher
quality science than all-male groups (Campbell et al., 2013;
Hofstra et al., 2020), and that differences in confidence levels
are often reflective of overconfidence in men (Cho, 2017). If
this is the case, then this kind of approach to addressing the
gender gap in science may serve only to conceal the under-
lying problem rather than addressing it (Black & Islam, 2014).
In summary, there is evidence that hierarchical behaviours,
overly competitive environments and issues relating to confi-
dence all present barriers to the wider participation of women
in science. In each case there is substantial evidence of gender
differences, with these differences also being correlated with
the influence of testosterone in addition to cultural and social
factors. In each case there is evidence that in some cases at
least these behaviours can be detrimental to the practice of
science. Improving participation has often involved training
women to perform better in existing social structures by
learning behaviours that are more compatible with those
structures (Black & Islam, 2014). I suggest that in some cases
this may mitigate some of the symptoms of a deeper structural
problem without addressing all of the causes. If these factors
are indeed detrimental to the practice of science, then it makes
more sense to change the system to both improve the practice
of science and reduce the barriers to participation.
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Addressing systemic biases of systems of which we are a
part is hard, particularly as it is often difficult to see the biases
inherent in the system from within, let alone how to address
them. I am trying to adopt the following principles and tenta-
tively suggest them as a starting point for other participants.
(i) We must continually listen to the experiences of women
in science, to scientists who experience gender in ways distinct
from traditional binary norms, and to those who are in the
position of having lived with both male-typical and female-
typical hormonal profiles, in order to better understand the
impact of structural gender biases.
(ii) We should also seek to continually learn from partici-
pants in science from other groups that are underrepresented
in the scientific community (who are otherwise invisible in this
letter), while at the same time learning to recognize how our
own preconceptions prevent us from hearing what they are
saying.
(iii) We should seek opportunities to disrupt existing
hierarchies. Scientific awards and keynote lectures both
concentrate credit on established leaders: these should be
used as opportunities to draw attention to the work of iden-
tified early-career researchers and to highlight the systemic
biases which are being reinforced.
(iv) We should recognize that incentive structures created
by funding bodies also drive competition and promote hier-
archical structures which do not necessarily align with scien-
tific imperatives. We should aim to use funding in ways which
mitigate those aspects of the funding scheme which are
counterproductive. The increasing priority given by funding
bodies to the open-science agenda may help here, although
funding bodies may still be constrained in the extent to which
they can realize these ambitions.
Adjusting my practice to better align with ethical and
scientific goals rather than social and funding norms also leads
to some immediate and specific actions. I am offering under-
graduate and postgraduate projects to understand how our
tools might be incorporated into competing packages in order
to improve those packages. I aim to release all future code
under Creative Commons licences, and am reviewing past
legal agreements to determine the extent to which existing
software can be made more reusable. Finally, in the context of
computational methods development, I note that it is critical
to better understand how traditional teaching methods lead to
unequal outcomes when training new generations of scientific
programmers (Cooper & Weaver, 2003), and to develop
teaching methods to address this problem.
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